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Summary. We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium
in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running
time of the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. We also
show that this result applies to the general class of bisection auctions. In contrast we show
that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there is a query
auction (to be more specific, a bisection auction) that attains this level of approximate efficiency
in equilibrium, while additionally the running time of the auction in equilibrium is finite for all
realizations of valuations.
Keywords and Phrases: Query auctions, ex post equilibrium, efficiency.
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D44.
1e.grigorieva@ke.unimaas.nl. Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box
616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands. The author acknowledges support by the Dutch Science Foundation
NWO through grant 401-01-101.
2p.herings@algec.unimaas.nl. Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD
Maastricht, The Netherlands. The author acknowledges support by the Dutch Science Foundation NWO through
a VICI-grant.
3r.muller@ke.unimaas.nl. Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616,
6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands. The author acknowledges support by European Commission through
funds for the International Institute of Infonomics.
4d.vermeulen@ke.unimaas.nl. Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616,
6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations 1
1 Introduction
This paper concerns the sales of a single indivisible item to n buyers by means of an auction,
each buyer having a private valuation vi for the item.
1 This setting has been thoroughly
analyzed and is very well understood. (see for example Krishna (2002)). The sealed-bid second
price auction by Vickrey (1961), and the ascending clock version of the English auction are
two strategically equivalent designs that solve the allocation problem in dominant strategies.
In the dominant strategy equilibrium both auctions allocate the item efficiently –they both
award the item to the bidder with the highest valuation. The Vickrey auction collects sealed
bids, allocates to the bidder with the highest bid (if more than one, using a lottery), and sets
the price equal to the second-highest bid. The ascending clock version of the English auction
continuously increases the price on a price clock, and bidders step out if the price becomes
larger than their willingness to pay. The clock stops when the second last bidder stepped out.
If at some point all remaining bidders step out simultaneously, the item is assigned by a lottery
among them at the current price.
This is in many cases a satisfactory way to auction a single indivisible item. It is however not
always feasible to execute either the Vickrey auction or the ascending clock auction, or for that
matter any other auction that is strategically equivalent to these. Our first main result identifies
such an environment –continuous valuations combined with a multi round query auction– in
which in equilibrium necessarily the item will be assigned inefficiently with positive probability,
unless one accepts the unrealistic phenomenon that the auction will last indefinitely –i.e. the
auction runs an infinite number of rounds– for almost all realizations of valuations. In other
words, any implementation of the Vickrey auction by means of a query auction in a model with
continuous valuations will necessarily have an infinite running time for almost all realizations
of valuations, and is hence not a feasible option in any practical sense.
We will now turn to a more detailed description of the exact environment in which and the
exact conditions under which our inefficiency result holds.
Continuous valuations. In many applications, there is nothing wrong with assuming dis-
crete valuations. It is however sometimes desirable to be able to run an auction without an
a-priori agreement on the discretization of bids. The leading example from which we draw our
motivation is a computerized bidding environment in multi-agent systems. In such an envi-
ronment the precision with which bidding agents represent their valuations might be unknown,
1We assume quasi-linear utilities throughout the paper.
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and therefore preferably be left unspecified. One way to model this is to allow valuations to
take on continuous values. Also time constraints –an issue of some importance in combinatorial
auctions like the UMTS auctions– can thus be captured, since time restrictions might force an
auctioneer to determine valuations only up to a level of precision that is not of the same order
of magnitude in which bidders do, or would like to, express valuations.
Query auctions. The computerized bidding environment is modeled as a query auction. In a
query auction the auctioneer sequentially offers bidders the opportunity to take one of a finite
set of actions. Such an offer is referred to as a query. 2 During the course of the auction each
bidder may be, and usually will be, queried more than once. Typically an “action” takes the
form of an answer to a query regarding the valuation of the bidder in question, such as “Is your
valuation larger than 15?” to which the response can be either a yes or a no.
Determination of winner and payment in a query auction are based exclusively on the actions
taken by the bidders in response to the queries of the auctioneer. The auction ends as soon as
both winner and payment are determined. The number of times a particular bidder is queried
during the auction is not assumed to be bounded, and the auction may thus potentially take
an infinite number of query rounds. We will only consider ex post individually rational query
auctions, meaning that each bidder, given his valuation vi, has a plan of action in the auction
that guarantees him a non-negative payoff, regardless of the behavior of the other bidders.
Inefficiency of ex post equilibrium. In this paper we investigate the efficiency of ex post
equilibria in query auctions. An ex post equilibrium is a strategy profile such that, given any
realization of valuations, the plan of action prescribed to a bidder in the auction by his strategy
is a best response to the plans of action prescribed by the strategies of the other bidders given
their valuations. The first main result in this paper can now be precisely formulated as follows.
An ex post equilibrium is called sometimes finite if the set of realizations of valuations for which
in equilibrium the auction ends in finite time has positive Lebesgue measure. The result is that,
given any ex post individually rational query auction, any ex post equilibrium in that auction
that is sometimes finite cannot be ex post efficient.
Existence of ex post equilibrium in bisection auctions. Still, ex post equilibrium need
2Each separate query by the auctioneer could be thought of as a round in the auction because the action
taken by the queried bidder is, at least in our setting, supposed to be publicly observable. Only actions whose
effects can only be observed at the same moment in time by other bidders are usually considered to be taken
in the same round. Rounds typically differ from each other in terms of the information available to bidders. In
that sense each query could be counted as a round. In this paper though we deviate slightly from this standard
interpretation. The order in which bidders are queried is usually fixed, and a round is a sequence of queries in
which each bidder is queried exactly once.
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not always exist, which would render our first result useless. Therefore we show that for a very
wide class of query auctions, namely the so-called bisection auctions, an ex post equilibrium
exists. We show that a bisection auction is indeed ex post individually rational, and that the
ex post equilibrium in a bisection auction is indeed sometimes finite. Thus our first result
applies to this class of auctions. Moreover, under a mild assumption (namely that the price in
the auction can in principle be driven up to exceed any possible valuation of any bidder, an
assumption that is met by all existing auctions) the equilibrium can even be shown to be finite
for any realization of valuations.
The bisection mechanism works as follows. Valuations of bidders are assumed to be drawn from
an interval I = [α, β). Before the auction starts, an order of the bidders in the auction is chosen
randomly. We assume that this ordering is 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3 ≺ · · · ≺ n− 1 ≺ n.
The auction runs for an a priori indefinite number of rounds. In each round there is a specific
payment P to be made by a bidder if he wins in this round. In every round there is also a query
price Q which is higher than the current payment and an upper bound H on future payments
that is higher than the query price. Initially the payment and the upper bound are set as P = α
and H = β, and all bidders are active. In every round the auctioneer asks the bidders that are
active in that round whether they would be willing to pay the query price. Bidders are queried
openly in increasing order.
If only one bidder is willing to pay the query price, he becomes the winner of the auction. He
has to pay the current payment (not the query price). If more than 1 bidder is willing to pay
the query price, the auction proceeds into the next round. Only those bidders who agreed to
pay the query price stay active. The query price becomes the payment, and the new query
price is raised to a level strictly above the old query price, but still below the upper bound. If
no bidder is willing to pay the query price all bidders stay active, the payment stays the same,
the old query price becomes the new upper bound, and the new query price is set between the
new payment and the new upper bound. In case no winner is found, i.e., should the auction
run indefinitely, then among the bidders who are still active the one with highest ranking wins
and he pays the lowest price that is still higher than or equal to any of the payments that were
announced while the auction was running.
Effectively a bisection auction is a variation of the bisection auction presented in Grigorieva et al.
(2002), the main two differences being that in the present paper the auction may last indef-
initely, and that the auction stops as soon as the winner is found. The bisection auction in
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Grigorieva et al. (2002) was designed to handle the situation in which bidders have discrete valu-
ations. The present definition of a bisection auction is specifically designed to handle continuous
valuations.
The second result of this paper is that each bisection auction has an ex post equilibrium. Given
a bisection auction we construct a specific equilibrium, called the bluff equilibrium, for that
auction. The bluff equilibrium requires each bidder to act as follows. When there still is an
active bidder with a lower rank in the ordering, the bidder stays in the auction until the query
price exceeds his valuation. As soon as he becomes the active bidder with the lowest rank, he
stays in the auction until the lower bound exceeds his valuation (effectively a bluff since he
will say yes to a query price exceeding his valuation). We show that this strategy is ex post
individually rational, and that the resulting profile where each bidder uses this strategy is an
ex post equilibrium. We also show that the bluff equilibrium is sometimes finite –and hence
not ex post efficient according to our first result.
In the second half of the paper we analyze exactly how (in)efficient ex post equilibria, in
particular the bluff equilibrium, may be. In particular we show that approximate efficiency can
be achieved within the family of fixed fraction auctions, a special class of bisection auctions.
Fixed fraction auctions. In a fixed fraction auction, given the payment P and upper bound
H in any round, the query price in that round is given by Q = (1 − c)P + cH, where c is a
real number in the interval (0, 1). Thus, the increment with which the payment P is increased
is a fixed fraction c of the current price interval [P,H) (the interval that contains all future
payments, no matter what responses the bidders give to future queries).
As a measure of inefficiency we employ the probability of inefficient allocation. We assume that
valuations of bidders are drawn independently from the uniform distribution on the interval
[α, β). 3 The probability of inefficient allocation is the probability –according to the joint prob-
ability distribution on [α, β)n– of the set of realizations of valuations for which in equilibrium
the item does not get assigned to a bidder with the highest valuation.
The main finding in this part of the paper is that for the fixed fraction auction with fraction
c the probability of inefficient allocation is smaller than or equal to c, no matter how many
bidders participate in the auction. Moreover, the running time of a fixed fraction auction in the
bluff equilibrium is finite for all realizations of valuations. Thus, the minimum level of efficiency
3We use the uniform distribution merely for ease of exposition. Our results in the second part of the paper
hold as soon as valuations are i.i.d. draws from an arbitrary continuous probability distribution on [α, β).
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can be determined by the auctioneer before it is known how many bidders will participate in the
auction by choosing the appropriate fraction c, and finite running time is guaranteed. However,
we also show that the probability of inefficient allocation is bounded away from zero. In other
words, given the fraction c, the probability of inefficient allocation does not converge to zero as
the number of participants becomes large. This implies that c is the only tool available to the
auctioneer to control the level of inefficiency, increasing the number of participants is not an
appropriate method.
As a comment on the full generality of these statements, we stress again that the same con-
clusions can be obtained for any continuous probability distribution on [α, β) from which val-
uations are independently drawn. In this general setting we construct a bisection auction, not
necessarily a fixed fraction auction, for which all the above claims hold as well.
These results alleviate the severity of our initial inefficiency result. The inefficiency result
said that in our setting efficiency can only be achieved at the expense of an infinite running
time of the auction for almost all realizations of valuations. The second part of the paper
on the other hand shows that, by choosing the appropriate auction, we can have approximate
efficiency (meaning that the probability of inefficient allocation can be made arbitrarily small)
in equilibrium, while the running time of the auction in equilibrium is finite for all realizations
of valuations. Moreover, given the desired level of efficiency, the particular choice of auction
can be made independently of the number of bidders that will participate in the auction.
Related literature. Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) study a model with continuous valuations
where bidders are obedient and can only bid on a finite number of bid levels. They derive
bounds on the loss of welfare and show that, when valuations are uniformly distributed, for 2
bidders and m bid levels the evenly spaced bid level auction is revenue optimal as well as welfare
optimal, with a loss of welfare of 16m2 . In the same model David et al. (2005) argue that a multi-
round version of the auction with discrete bid levels has truthful bidding as a dominant strategy
equilibrium. They show that in equilibrium for more than 2 bidders the optimal auction has
decreasing bid increments, and subsequently analyze the probability of efficient allocation for
both evenly spaced bid levels and the optimal choice of bid levels. Also Blumrosen and Nisan
(2002) and Blumrosen et al. (2003) study a model where bidders have continuous valuations and
a finite set of bid levels. They show that in their model truthful bidding is a dominant strategy
equilibrium and derive bounds on the loss of welfare in equilibrium. Parkes (2005) studies
a model in which bidders are uncertain about their preferences and preference elicitation is
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costly. He shows that in such an environment ascending price query auctions can achieve better
allocative efficiency than a sealed bid auction, using less elicitation of preferences.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 is a preliminary section where we collected most of
the known results on auction design that we use in this paper. In section 3 we show that, when
valuations are continuous, efficiency of ex post equilibria in query auctions can only be obtained
at the expense of an infinite running time of the auction for almost all realizations of valuations.
In section 4 we provide a family of query auctions, the bisection auctions, in which we prove the
existence of an ex post individually rational ex post equilibrium, called the bluff equilibrium,
that has a finite running time for a non-negligible set of valuations. Hence bluff equilibria are
ex post inefficient. In section 5 we show that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with
arbitrarily small –but positive– probability, there is a bisection auction that attains this level
of inefficiency in equilibrium, while the running time is finite for every realization of valuations.
Section 6 concludes. Appendix 1 is devoted to an elementary proof of the Theorem of Green
and Laffont in our (simple) context. Appendix 2 contains proofs of statements that are used in
section 4.
2 Preliminaries
We will briefly discuss the notions used in this paper. A single indivisible object is being sold
to a set N = {1, . . . , n} of bidders by means of a deterministic auction. The set of actions of
bidder i is denoted by Fi. Write F =
∏
i Fi. The winner determination rule
w : F → N
decides for each profile f = (fi)i∈N of actions in F who the winner of the object is. The
payment function
p : F → R
determines for each profile f of actions in F the amount p(f) the winner w(f) has to pay to
the auctioneer. A triplet (F,w, p) is an auction.
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR Each bidder has a valuation vi for the item. Valuations are drawn
from a non-degenerate interval I and are assumed to be private information. Bidders have to
decide in advance which action to choose for each valuation they might possibly have. Thus, a
strategy of bidder i is a function si : I → Fi stating that bidder i, when having valuation vi ∈ I,
will take action si(vi) in Fi. A vector s = (si)i∈N of strategies is called a strategy profile.
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A realization v = (vi)i∈N of valuations defines an ex post game (F,w, p, v) with action space
Fi for bidder i and payoff function ui(vi) : F → R defined by
ui(vi)(f) :=
{
vi − p(f) if i = w(f);
0 otherwise.
Since the ex post game (F,w, p, v) is a game in normal form, the classical definition of Nash
equilibrium applies. An action profile f = (fi)i∈N is a Nash equilibrium of the ex post game
(F,w, p, v) if for every bidder i and every action gi ∈ Fi of that bidder it holds that
ui(vi)(f) ≥ ui(vi)(f | gi)
where (f | gi) denotes the action profile where bidder i chooses gi and every other bidder j
chooses fj . A strategy profile s = (si)i∈N is an ex post equilibrium of the auction (F,w, p) if
for every realization v = (vi)i∈N of valuations the action profile s(v) := (si(vi))i∈N in F is a
Nash equilibrium of the ex post game (F,w, p, v).
In the same way other notions also carry over to the setting of an auction. A strategy si of
bidder i is dominant if for every realization vi of the valuation of bidder i and any profile f of
actions
ui(vi)(f | si(vi)) ≥ ui(vi)(f | gi)
holds for any action gi ∈ Fi. Given a strategy profile s, strategy si is a best response for player
i to s if
ui(vi)(s(v)) ≥ ui(vi)(s(v) | fi)
for any realization v = (vi)i∈N of valuations and any action fi ∈ Fi. Strategy si is ex post
individually rational if for every realization vi of the valuation of bidder i and any profile f of
actions,
ui(vi)(f | si(vi)) ≥ 0.
The auction (F,w, p) itself is called ex post individually rational if every bidder has an ex post
individually rational strategy in it. A strategy profile s is called ex post efficient if for every
realization v = (vi)i∈N it holds that
w(s(v)) ∈ arg max{vi | i ∈ N}.
DIRECT AUCTIONS An auction (F,w, p) is called direct if Fi = I for each bidder i. In other
words, the action a bidder has to take in the auction is to report a valuation (not necessarily his
true valuation). Since in a direct auction it is clear what the action spaces are, we will simply
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write (w, p) to denote such an auction. A straightforward but important observation is that
any strategy profile s in (F,w, p) automatically induces a direct auction (w ◦ s, p ◦ s).
A direct auction (w, p) is called a Vickrey auction if for every profile r = (ri)i∈N of reported
valuations in IN it holds that
w(r) ∈ arg max{ri | i ∈ N} and p(r) := max{ri | i 6= w(r)}.
It is very well known that in a Vickrey auction bidding your valuation is a dominant strategy.
If every bidder bids according to this strategy, the outcome is ex post efficient, and the winner
pays an amount equal to the second-highest valuation.
A THEOREM OF GREEN AND LAFFONT In the next section we will use the following version
of a Theorem by Green and Laffont, which shows under precisely which conditions a direct
auction is a Vickrey auction (see Green and Laffont (1977)). For completeness a proof is given
in Appendix 7.1.
Theorem 2.1 A direct auction (w◦s, p◦s) is a Vickrey auction if the following three conditions
hold
(a) the auction (F,w, p) is ex post individually rational;
(b) the strategy profile s is an ex post equilibrium of (F,w, p);
(c) the strategy profile s is ex post efficient in (F,w, p).
QUERY AUCTIONS Query auctions are already verbally defined in the introduction. We will
give formal definitions of the two specific types of query auctions that are used in this paper,
namely bisection auctions and fixed fraction auctions. However, for our purposes the verbal
description of a general query auction that is given in the introduction suffices.
3 Efficient query equilibria are almost always infinite
Suppose we are given a query auction (F,w, p) together with an ex post equilibrium s = (si)i∈N
in this auction. Such an equilibrium is called a query equilibrium. Let Z be the set of valuations
v = (vi)i∈N for which in the action profile s(v) := (si(vi))i∈N the auctioneer asks a finite number
of queries before the auction ends. We will assume that Z is measurable, and that moreover
w ◦ s is also measurable. When Z has Lebesgue measure equal to zero, we say that the query
equilibrium s is almost always infinite. When Z has Lebesgue measure greater than zero, we
say that s is sometimes finite.
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Theorem 3.1 Let s be a query equilibrium in (F,w, p) and suppose that s is sometimes finite.
Then the corresponding direct auction (w ◦ s, p ◦ s) is not a Vickrey auction.
Proof. Define
O(Z) := {(w(s(v)), p(s(v))) | v ∈ Z}.
Let Zk be the set of valuations v ∈ Z for which the auction ends after k queries given the profile
of actions s(v). Then the cardinality of the set
O(Zk) := {(w(s(v)), p(s(v)) | v ∈ Zk}
is finite since each player only has a finite number of possible responses to each query and the
determination of winner and payment is based exclusively on the responses of the bidders to
the queries of the auctioneer. Thus O(Z) = ∪∞k=1O(Z
k) is a countable set.
Now suppose that the corresponding direct auction (w ◦ s, p◦ s) is a Vickrey auction. Note that
O(Z) = {((w ◦ s)(v), (p ◦ s)(v)) | v ∈ Z}.
Define Zi := {v ∈ Z | (w ◦ s)(v) = i}. Since Z and w ◦ s are measurable by assumption, also
each Zi is measurable. So, since the Zi’s partition Z and the Lebesgue measure of Z is larger
than zero, we know that at least one Zi must have Lebesgue measure larger than zero as well.
Take such a Zi. Define for each p
∗ ∈ R
Zi(p
∗) := {v ∈ Zi | (p ◦ s)(v) = p
∗}.
Since (w ◦ s, p ◦ s) is a Vickrey auction we know that each set Zi(p
∗) is a subset of the set
{
v ∈ IN | max{vi | i 6= (w ◦ s)(v)} = p
∗
}
which has Lebesgue measure zero. Thus, each Zi(p
∗) itself is measurable and has Lebesgue
measure zero. Hence, the set
Pi := {p
∗ | Zi(p
∗) 6= φ}
must be uncountable, because Zi = ∪p∗∈PiZi(p
∗) and Zi has Lebesgue measure larger than zero.
The set O(Z) must have a cardinality that is at least as large as the cardinality of Pi because
p∗ 7→ (i, p∗) is an injective function from Pi to O(Z), so O(Z) is uncountable. This contradicts
our earlier conclusion that O(Z) is a countable set. Hence, the direct auction (w ◦ s, p ◦ s)
cannot be a Vickrey auction.
Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations 10
Theorem 3.2 Any ex post efficient ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query
auction is almost always infinite.
Proof. Consider an ex post efficient ex post equilibrium s in an ex post individually rational
query auction (F,w, p). Theorem 2.1 states that the corresponding direct auction (w◦s, p◦s) is
a Vickrey auction. However, if the equilibrium were sometimes finite, Theorem 3.1 states that
the corresponding direct auction (w ◦ s, p ◦ s) is not a Vickrey auction. Hence, the equilibrium
cannot be sometimes finite. Since Z is measurable by assumption, the equilibrium must be
almost always infinite.
4 Bisection auctions
Thus, in a setting with continuous valuations, any (measurable) ex post equilibrium in an ex
post individually rational query auction that ends with positive probability in finite time will
necessarily be inefficient. In this section we describe a family of query auctions, called bisection
auctions, to which this inefficiency result applies. The main characteristics of the family of
bisection auctions are that they have a fixed order in which active bidders are queried, they all
use a binary search algorithm to determine the price, and they all stop as soon as the winner
is found. We show that each bisection auction has an ex post individually rational ex post
equilibrium, called the bluff equilibrium. We also show that the bluff equilibrium is sometimes
finite, and even, under a mild condition (namely that the price in the auction can be driven
up to exceed any possible valuation of any bidder, an assumption that is met by all existing
auctions), has a running time that is finite for all realizations of valuations. Hence, these
equilibria will be inefficient. In the next section we discuss in more detail the extent to which
bluff equilibria are, or are not, efficient.
4.1 Formal definition of a bisection auction
A bisection auction in the form we describe it here is specifically designed to handle the case in
which valuations are drawn from an interval I = [α, β). We will however first give a description
of a bisection auction that is free from any reference to valuations of the bidders.
We represent a bisection auction as an extensive form game on a complete binary decision tree.
We will describe this tree first and subsequently discuss the winner determination rule W and
the payment scheme P to give a complete description of the auction.
The playing field
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We provide a complete description of the game tree. This tree is the same for the entire family
of bisection auctions. The nodes of the tree are given in (1) and the directed edges are defined
in (2). The game board has perfect information, meaning that each node in the tree will be a
decision node for one of the players. Hence information sets are obsolete.
The set of players that can participate in the game is N = {1, . . . , n}. The response set for
each player in every query node is R = {yes, no}. This reflects the fact that in each round of
the auction each player will be faced with a binary query regarding his valuation. The precise
nature of this query is explained in the next subsection.
(1) A node a in the game tree is represented by the history of responses players have to give
in order to reach this particular node. Formally, a = (ak)
r
k=1 with r ∈ N where ak = (ak,i)
n
i=1
for k < r and ar = (ar,i)
j
i=1 for some j ≤ n. Here ak,i is a particular response in the set R
chosen by player i in round k.
The length of a node is defined as l(a) = (r−1)n+ j. The initial node a0 = ( ) has length zero.
This node corresponds to the first round where the first player has to respond. The nodes with
length greater than or equal to (r−1)n but less than rn correspond to round r, where the nodes
with length (r − 1)n are referred to as the start of round r. The set of nodes corresponding to
round r is denoted by Xr. For a node a ∈ Xr, the node a
∗ ∈ Xr is the node of length (r − 1)n
for which a∗k,i = ak,i for all k < r and all i ∈ N .
A node a that has a length of l(a) = (r−1)n+j−1 for some r > 0 is a decision node of player j
in round r. 4 Let Dj denote the collection of all decision nodes of player j and Djr denote the
collection of player j’s decision nodes in round r. A predecessor of a decision node a of player
j is a node from Dj that player j encounters when moving from the initial node a0 to node a.
We denote by a(k) ∈ Djk the predecessor of a in round k. Conversely, a is a successor of a(k).
(2) There is a directed edge from node a to node b if l(b) = l(a) + 1, and for all j and k for
which ak,j is defined, ak,j = bk,j . So, there is an edge between two nodes if in the second node
one player has given an additional response in comparison with the first node.
Winner determination and payment rules
The next ingredient of the description of the game is the determination of the winner of the
item and the specification of payments. As we allow bisection auctions to last indefinitely, we
will define the winner and the payment on infinite sequences of actions, which we call endnodes.
4Notice that this implies that the bidders are queried according to the fixed ordering 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3 ≺ · · · ≺
n− 1 ≺ n.
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Thus, an endnode of the game is an infinite sequence h = (hr,i)r∈N,i∈N of nodes in the game
tree such that (1) h1,1 = a0 (the initial node is the first element of this sequence), and (2) there
is an edge from node hr,i to node hr,i+1 for any i < n, and from node hr,n to node hr+1,1 for
any r ∈ N.
Each endnode (hr,i)r∈N,i∈N may be viewed as a history of infinite length such that its upper
part of length (r − 1)n + i− 1 coincides with node hr,i. Thus, the set of all possible endnodes
of the game is order isomorphic to the set 2N.
WINNER DETERMINATION For an endnode h = (hr,i)r∈N,i∈N , we denote by A(h) the set of
players who remain active throughout the play, that is A(h) = ∩rA(h
r,1), where for a node
a ∈ X1 we define the set of active players by A(a) := N and for a node a ∈ Xr+1 for some
r ≥ 1 we define the set A(a) of active players iteratively by
A(a) :=
{
A(a(r)) if ar,i = no ∀i ∈ A(a(r));
{i ∈ A(a(r)) : ar,i = yes} otherwise.
Notice that |A(h)| ≥ 1 will always hold. The winner of the game in endnode h is
W (h) := max {i | i ∈ A(h)}.
PAYMENT RULE The difference between different bisection auctions is in the payment rule.
Suppose that I = [α, β). The price the winner pays depends on when it became known that
he is the winner. We will first provide a recursive description of the way the payment rule is
constructed.
First we associate with each node a ∈ Xr of length (r−1)n a current price interval [P (a),H(a))
and a query price Q(a) in the interior of this half-open interval. The query price Q(a) bisects
the current interval [P (a),H(a)) into two intervals [P (a), Q(a)) and [Q(a),H(a)) of smaller
size. For this reason we call this auction a bisection auction.
Once the game has reached node a ∈ Xr, the price P (a
∗) is the minimum amount the winner,
whoever it may be, will have to pay, regardless of what happens from now on. In the same way
H(a∗) is a hard upper bound on the payment of the winner. The query in round r associated
with the query price Q(a∗) is
Is your valuation greater than or equal to the query price Q(a∗)?
The answer to this query is an element of the response set R = {yes, no}, and only the responses
of players that are currently active (in round r that is) can influence the outcome of the auction.
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Formally P (a0) := α and H(a0) := β, and Q(a0) is an element of the interval (P (a0),H(a0)).
For a node a ∈ Xr of length (r − 1)n with r > 1 we recursively define
P (a) :=
{
P (a(r − 1)) if |{i ∈ A(a(r − 1)) : ar−1,i = yes}| ≤ 1
Q(a(r − 1)) otherwise.
and
H(a) :=
{
Q(a(r − 1)) if |{i ∈ A(a(r − 1)) : ar−1,i = yes}| ≤ 1
H(a(r − 1)) otherwise.
Finally, we again choose Q(a) in the interval (P (a),H(a)).
Now, for an endnode h = (hr,i)r∈N,i∈N with |A(h)| = 1 we define the running time of the
auction by T (h) = min{r ∈ N : |A(hr,1)| = 1}. Otherwise we define the running time by
T (h) = ∞. The price the winner in endnode h pays is
P (h) := sup {P (hr,1) | r ≤ T (h)}.
All other players pay zero. The resulting payoff in endnode h for player j having valuation vj
is given by
Uj(vj)(h) :=
{
vj − P (h) if j = W (h)
0 otherwise.
This completes the description of a bisection auction in its representation as a query auction.
Notice that effectively a bisection auction is completely characterized by the choices of α and
β, and the choices of the query price Q(a) for every node a that has a length (r − 1)n for
some r ≥ 1. The price bounds P (a) and H(a) as well as winner determination and payment
specification are uniquely determined by the choices of α, β, and the queries Q(a).
One-shot representation of bisection auctions
A bisection auction is a query auction, meaning that the auction has multiple rounds and in each
round the players can give several (two in this case) responses to the queries of the auctioneer.
We will briefly discuss how the one-shot representation (F,w, p) of such an auction looks like
in the terminology of Section 2.
A plan of action of player j is a function fj that assigns to each decision node a ∈ Dj a
response fj(a) in R. The action set Fj is the collection of all plans of action of player j.
For the profile of plans of action f = (fi)i∈N in F :=
∏
i Fi the winner w(f) and payment
p(f) are now defined as follows. The realization of f is the endnode h = (hr,i)r∈N,i∈N where
h1,1 = a0, h
r,i+1 = (hr,i, fi(h
r,i)) for any i < n and hr+1,1 = (hr,n, fn(h
r,n)) for any r ∈ N.
Then w(f) := W (h) and p(f) := P (h). Automatically uj(vj)(f) = Uj(vj)(h).
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This auction will be ex post individually rational as long as valuations are larger than or equal
to α. Indeed, in this case always saying no guarantees a player a non-negative payoff. If a
player does so he can win only if all other players also keep on saying no, in which case the
payment for the winner is α.
4.2 Ex post equilibrium
In this section we will introduce for each bisection auction a strategy profile that constitutes
an individually rational ex-post Nash equilibrium in the given bisection auction. We will also
show that in equilibrium there is a set of valuations whose Lebesgue measure is larger than zero
for which the auction ends in finite time. Consequently, in equilibrium, the allocation is not ex
post efficient.
Consider the bisection auction. Define the set of players who have ranking less than j and are
active in node a ∈ Dj by
Aj(a) := {i ∈ A(a) : i < j}.
These are the players whose decisions in the current round are observable for player j when he
has to make a decision in node a. Let
D1j := ∪r{a ∈ Djr | ∃i ∈ Aj(a) : ar,i = yes}
be the set of decision nodes of player j such that there is at least one active predecessor of
player j whose action in the current round was yes. Thus, D2j := Dj\D
1
j is the set of decision
nodes of player j such that all active predecessors of player j took decision no.
As before, a strategy for player j in the bisection auction is a function sj that assigns to each
possible valuation vj ∈ [α, β) a plan of action sj(vj) in Fj . Thus, for each decision node a ∈ Dj
of player j, sj(vj) specifies a response sj(vj)(a) in R.
Definition 4.1 Let vj be a valuation of player j and let a ∈ Dj be a decision node of player
j. The bluff strategy bj of player j is defined by
bj(vj)(a) :=


yes if a ∈ D1j and Q(a
∗) ≤ vj
yes if a ∈ D2j and P (a
∗) ≤ vj
no otherwise.
This strategy has a bluffing component with regard to the query “Is your valuation greater than
the current query price?”. Indeed, in D1j player j compares his valuation vj with the current
query price and in any node from D2j with the current payment. So in nodes from D
2
j when his
valuation is greater than the payment even if it is smaller than the query he replies yes and thus
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deceives the auctioneer by pretending to have higher valuation than he really has. Therefore
one can think of nodes from D1j as truthful nodes and nodes from D
2
j as bluff nodes.
Now we will show that the profile b = (bi)i∈N of bluff strategies constitutes an ex post individ-
ually rational ex post equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2 A bluff strategy is ex post individually rational. Hence, as said before, bisec-
tion auctions are ex post individually rational.
Proof. Suppose that player j follows his bluff strategy and due to the plans of action chosen
by the other players endnode h is realized. If j 6= W (h) then uj(vj)(h) = 0. So, suppose that
j = W (h). We consider two cases. Case 1: if T (h) < ∞. Let a be the decision node of player j
in round T (h). Then all players in Aj(a) said no, while player j said yes. Therefore vj ≥ P (a
∗),
and since P (a∗) is the price to be paid by j, he has a non-negative payoff. Case 2: if T (h) = ∞.
Since j = W (h), Lemma 7.2 implies that player j said yes in every round. Then, by definition
of the bluff strategy, P (hr,1) ≤ vj for every r. Hence, also P (h) ≤ vj .
Theorem 4.3 The strategy profile b = (bi)i∈N is an ex post Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let (vi)i∈N be a realization of valuations and fj ∈ Fj be a plan of action of player
j. Let a be the first decision node at which player j following fj deviates from bj(vj). In case
player j is not active in node a both bj(vj) and fj yield payoff 0 and we are done. So suppose
that player j is active in node a. We consider two cases.
Case 1. In case a ∈ D1j . If fj(a) = no and bj(vj)(a) = yes, the payoff of playing fj is 0,
while according to Proposition 4.2 the payoff of playing bj(vj) is at least 0. Consider the case
where fj(a) = yes and bj(vj)(a) = no. When player j says yes in a, there are at least two
players who say yes in the current round by definition of D1j . So, the winning payment will be
at least Q(a∗). Further, vj < Q(a
∗) because bj(vj)(a) = no. Hence, the payoff of playing fj is
non-positive while the payoff of playing bj(vj) is 0.
Case 2. In case a ∈ D2j . If fj(a) = yes and bj(vj)(a) = no we know that P (a
∗) > vj . Since
the payment of the winner is at least P (a∗), playing fj has non-positive payoff, while playing
bj(vj) guarantees non-negative payoff. Consider the case where fj(a) = no and bj(vj)(a) = yes.
Suppose that b(v) = bi(vi)i∈N is such that all successors of j say no if j says yes. Then, following
bj(vj) player j wins at price P (a
∗) while following fj he might win at price at least P (a
∗). Now
suppose that there is a successor i of j that plays yes if player j says yes. Since player i plays
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according to bi(vi), he will also say yes when player j switches to no. But then the payoff of
playing fj would be 0 while the payoff of playing bj(vj) is non-negative.
The following example shows that bidders that do not have the highest ranking do not have a
dominant strategy. Hence the previous result cannot be strengthened much further. It can be
shown that the bluff strategy is a dominant strategy for bidder n.
Example. Consider a game with two players and suppose that player 2 has the following
strategy: if in the first round player 1 says yes then play yes in the first round and no in all
other rounds; otherwise play no in all rounds. Then any best response of player 1 against this
strategy chooses no in the first round (and yes in some later round) whenever the valuation of
player 1 is strictly larger than zero. Now, consider another strategy of player 2: if in the first
round player 1 says yes then play no in all rounds; otherwise play yes in the first round and
no in all other rounds. In this case any best response of player 1 against this strategy chooses
yes in the first round (in decision node a0) whenever the valuation of player 1 is strictly larger
than zero. It follows that there is no strategy of player 1 which is a best response against both
strategies of player 2. Consequently player 1 doesn’t have a dominant strategy.
Theorem 4.4 The strategy profile b = (bi)i∈N is sometimes finite. Consequently, the allocation
under b is not ex post efficient.
Proof. Consider the set V of realizations v = (vi)i∈N of valuations for which α ≤ vi < Q(a0)
for all i ∈ N . Then for each v ∈ V in round 1 bidder 1 says yes and all other bidders say no.
Thus, the auction ends after this first round, and the Lebesgue measure of the set of valuations
for which the auction ends after one round is at least
(
Q(a0) − α
)n
> 0. Consequently, by
Theorems 3.2, 4.2, and 4.3, the allocation under b is not ex post efficient.
As in the above proof, consider the set V of realizations v = (vi)i∈N of valuations for which
α ≤ vi < Q(a0) for all i ∈ N . A direct way to conclude that allocation under b is not ex post
efficient is via the observation that for each v ∈ V bidder 1 wins the item (for a price of α).
So, if we take for example v1 = α, and vi =
Q(a0)+α
2 for all i 6= 1, then the allocation is not ex
post efficient.
4.3 Finite running time
Not every bisection auction will have a finite running time under the bluff equilibrium for any
realization of valuations. If we take for example α = 0, β = 1, and for each a ∈ Xr
Q(a∗) = (1−
1
(r + 1)2
)P (a∗) +
1
(r + 1)2
H(a∗)
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we get a bisection auction for which for each endnode h we have that P (h) ≤ 34 .
5 It is clear
that the running time in equilibrium is not finite as soon as at least two players have a valuation
larger than 34 . In order to exclude such pathological cases, consider the quantity
P ∗ := sup{P (a) | a is of length (r − 1)n for some r ∈ N}.
This quantity is the price the winner has to pay in the bisection auction when in any round
there are at least two players who say yes to their query in that round.
We say that a bisection auction is regular if P ∗ = β. Regularity implies for example that the
price can in principle be driven up by the bidding process to a level where a bidder makes a
loss if he becomes the winner.
As an immediate consequence of Lemma 7.3, the bluff equilibrium of a regular bisection auction
guarantees a finite running time for any realization of valuations. Notice that this statement is
stronger than just saying that we have a finite running time almost surely. Furthermore, from
Lemma 7.1 it immediately follows that, when every bidder plays according to his bluff strategy,
in any round of the auction there is at least one player that says yes. Thus we have established
the following Theorem.
Theorem 4.5 In a regular bisection auction the profile of bluff strategies has a finite running
time for any realization of valuations. Moreover, the query price increases from round to round
up to the moment where the winner is found.
5 Approximate efficiency in bisection auctions
From Theorem 4.4 we know that the bluff equilibrium of a bisection auction cannot be ex
post efficient. In the next two sections we investigate in more detail the level of inefficiency
of the bluff equilibrium. The measure of efficiency (or inefficiency) we use is the probability
that the auction allocates efficiently (inefficiently). We show that, with an appropriate choice
of auction, the probability of inefficient allocation can be made as small as we like, irrespective
of the number of bidders that will participate in the auction.
For ease of exposition we initially do this in the context of a special type of bisection auction,
called fixed fraction auctions, and for the uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1). In sub-
section 5.3 we will argue that these results can also be obtained for an arbitrary continuous
probability distribution on the interval [α, β).
5Because Q(a∗) ≤
∑
∞
r=1
1
(r+1)2
≤ 1
4
+
∫
∞
r=2
1
s
2
ds. Equivalently, use the fact that 1
(r+1)2
≤ 1
r(r+1)
= 1
r
− 1
r+1
for every r ≥ 2.
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We start with the definition of a fixed fraction auction. In the fixed fraction auction with fixed
fraction c ∈ (0, 1), the query price Q(a∗) in node a ∈ Xr is given by
Q(a∗) := (1− c)P (a∗) + cH(a∗)
in the current price interval [P (a∗),H(a∗)). Thus the query price Q(a∗) is P (a∗) plus an
increment equal to a fixed fraction c of the size of the current price interval. It is straightforward
to check that fixed fraction auctions are indeed regular. Hence, by Theorem 4.5, under the bluff
equilibrium a fixed fraction auction ends in finite time regardless of the realization of valuations.
5.1 The associated direct auction
In the next subsection we compute the probability of inefficient allocation of fixed fraction
auctions when the equilibrium b = (bi)i∈N is played. To make these computations easier to
understand, we first provide a concrete description of the direct auction associated with the
bluff equilibrium of a fixed fraction auction. This description is used in the next subsection.
For the moment we assume that private valuations of players are independently drawn from
the uniform distribution on the interval I = [0, 1). Given the fixed fraction auction with
fraction c, consider the following associated direct auction (wdirect, pdirect). For r ∈ N, write
Ir := [1 − (1− c)
r−1
, 1 − (1− c)
r
). Note that the intervals I1, I2, I3, . . . partition the unit
interval [0, 1) from which valuations are drawn. Now let v = (vi)i∈N be a profile of valuations.
Write Ir(v) := Ir ∩ {vi | i ∈ N}, the set of valuations that are in Ir. Let r(v) be the highest
natural number r for which Ir(v) is not empty. Then wdirect is defined by
wdirect(v) := min{i ∈ N | vi ∈ Ir(v)}.
Let s(v) be the highest natural number r for which Ir∩{vi | i ∈ N, i 6= wdirect(v)} is not empty.
The payment function pdirect is defined by
pdirect(v) :=
{
1− (1− c)
s(v)−1
if i > wdirect(v) for all i ∈ Is(v)(v)
1− (1− c)
s(v)
else.
We will now show that (wdirect, pdirect) equals the direct auction (w ◦ b, p ◦ b) where w and p
are defined as in Section 4 and b = (bi)i∈N is the bluff equilibrium. We call this auction the
direct fixed fraction auction.
Theorem 5.1 For any realization v = (vi)i∈N of valuations it holds that wdirect(v) = (w◦b)(v)
and pdirect(v) = (p ◦ b)(v). Consequently, truthful bidding is a dominant strategy in the direct
auction (wdirect, pdirect).
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Proof. Let v = (vi)i∈N be a realization of valuations. By Theorem 4.5 we know that the price
will always increase. Consider the round s(v) in which the price is equal to 1−(1− c)
s(v)−1
and
the query price is equal to 1 − (1− c)
s(v)
. The active bidders in round s(v) are (w ◦ b)(v), all
bidders i with vi ∈ Is(v), and –possibly– one more bidder i
∗ with vi∗ ∈ Is(v)−1 who happened
to be the bidder with the lowest ranking number among those bidders that were active in the
previous round and said yes in that round. We distinguish three cases.
Case 1. If i∗ exists. Bidder i∗ will say no in this round s(v), and the next active bidder, say
j, in the bidding order will say yes. If j = (w ◦ b)(v) then all other active bidders say no. So,
(w ◦ b)(v) = min{i ∈ N | vi ∈ Ir(v)} and (p ◦ b)(v) = 1 − (1− c)
s(v)−1
. If j 6= (w ◦ b)(v) then
both j and (w ◦ b)(v) say yes in this round, while all other active bidders say no. In the next
round though j will say no and (w ◦ b)(v) says yes. Hence in this case (w ◦ b)(v) = min{i ∈ N |
vi ∈ Ir(v)} and (p ◦ b)(v) = 1− (1− c)
s(v)
.
Case 2. If i∗ does not exist and i > (w◦b)(v) for all i ∈ Is(v)(v). In this case (w◦b)(v) says yes
in round s(v) while all other active bidders say no. Hence (w ◦ b)(v) = min{i ∈ N | vi ∈ Ir(v)}
and (p ◦ b)(v) = 1− (1− c)
s(v)−1
.
Case 3. When not in Case 1 or 2. Then an active bidder j 6= (w ◦ b)(v) says yes in round
s(v) together with (w ◦ b)(v), while all other bidders say no. In round s(v) + 1 bidder j says
no and bidder (w ◦ b)(v) says yes. Hence in this case (w ◦ b)(v) = min{i ∈ N | vi ∈ Ir(v)} and
(p ◦ b)(v) = 1− (1− c)
s(v)
.
5.2 Performance results
In this subsection we consider how efficient a fixed fraction auction is when the equilibrium
profile of bluff strategies is played. In particular we show that the probability of inefficient
allocation in the bluff equilibrium for the fixed fraction auction with fraction c is less than c,
independent of the number of bidders that participate in the auction. Thus, by choosing the
appropriate fixed fraction auction, the probability of inefficient allocation can be made as small
as we like, independent of the number of bidders !! We however also show that, for fixed c,
the probability of inefficient allocation is larger than a certain positive constant no matter how
many bidders participate in the auction. Thus, we can reduce this probability only by reducing
the fraction c, not by increasing the number of participants.
Notice that by Theorem 5.1 the probability of inefficient allocation is the same for both a fixed
fraction auction under the bluff equilibrium and for the corresponding direct auction under the
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truthtelling equilibrium. Thus it suffices to compute bounds on the probability of inefficient
allocation for the corresponding direct fixed fraction auction under the truthtelling equilibrium.
Let c be the fraction. For the direct auction (wdirect, pdirect) we derive a recurrent relation for
the probability Pn(c) that the auction with n bidders terminates in an inefficient allocation
given that all bidders bid truthfully. Let v = (vi)i∈N be a realization of valuations. First
consider the case where all valuations are smaller than c. The probability of this event is cn.
Further, in this event the auction is only efficient when bidder 1, the winner of the auction in
this case, has the highest valuation. By symmetry this happens with probability 1
n
. Thus this
event contributes a term cn n−1
n
to the total probability of inefficient allocation Pn(c). Next
consider the case where k ≥ 1 bidders have a valuation greater than or equal to c and n − k
bidders have a valuation smaller than c. If k = 1, the direct bisection auction is efficient, so this
case adds zero probability to Pn(c). The event k ≥ 2 happens with probability
(
n
k
)
cn−k (1− c)
k
.
The probability of inefficient allocation in this case is equal to Pk(c) since the direct bisection
auction restricted to the interval [c, 1) with k bidders is isomorphic to the original direct bisection
auction with k bidders having valuations uniformly drawn from [0, 1). Hence
Pn(c) = c
n n− 1
n
+
n∑
k=2
(
n
k
)
cn−k (1− c)
k
Pk(c)
for all n ≥ 2. This can be rewritten to
(
1− (1− c)n
)
Pn(c) =
n− 1
n
· cn +
n−1∑
k=2
(
n
k
)
(1− c)kcn−kPk(c).
In particular, P2(c) =
1
2 ·
c
2−c . We will show that the probability of inefficiency Pn(c) is smaller
than c, and also bounded away from zero. In order to simplify computations, take λ := 1− c.
Write
Z(c) :=
∞∑
k=3
ck + kλck−1
1− λk − kλck−1 − ck
.
Theorem 5.2 For all n ≥ 2, Pn(c) ≤ c and Pn(c) ≥ e
−Z(c)P2(c).
Proof. First we show that Pn(c) ≤ c. Since P2(c) =
1
2 ·
c
2−c ≤ c, we know that our claim is
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true for n = 2. Suppose that Pk(c) ≤ c for all 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. Then
Pn(c) =
1
1− (1− c)n
[n− 1
n
· cn +
n−1∑
k=2
(
n
k
)
(1− c)kcn−k · Pk(c)
]
≤
1
1− (1− c)n
[
cn +
n−1∑
k=2
(
n
k
)
(1− c)kcn−k · c
]
=
1
1− (1− c)n
[
cn + c
(
1− cn − n(1− c)cn−1 − (1− c)n
)]
=
c(1− (1− c)n)
1− (1− c)n
+
cn − cn+1 − n(1− c)cn
1− (1− c)n
= c +
cn(1− c)(1− n)
1− (1− c)n
≤ c,
which concludes the proof for the upper bound on Pn(c).
Now we show that e−Z(c)P2(c) ≤ Pn(c). Define Bn(c) by B2(c) := P2(c) and
Bn(c) :=
1
1− λn
[
n−1∑
k=2
(
n
k
)
λkcn−kBk(c)
]
for n ≥ 3. A simple induction argument shows that Bn(c) ≤ Pn(c) for all n. We will show that
Bn(c) ≥ e
−ZP2(c) for all n. Define Q2(c) := 1 and for n ≥ 3
Qn(c) :=
1− λn − nλcn−1 − cn
1− λn
·Qn−1(c) =
n∏
k=3
1− λk − kλck−1 − ck
1− λk
.
We will first show that for all n ≥ 2, Bk(c) ≥ Qn(c)B2(c) holds for all 2 ≤ k ≤ n. Clearly
this holds for n = 2. Take n ≥ 3. Assume that for all 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 we have that Bk(c) ≥
Qn−1(c)B2(c). Since 0 < Qn(c) ≤ Qn−1(c) we have that Bk(c) ≥ Qn(c)B2(c) for all 2 ≤ k ≤
n− 1. For k = n,
Bn(c) =
1
1− λn
[
n−1∑
k=2
(
n
k
)
λkcn−kBk(c)
]
≥
1
1− λn
[
n−1∑
k=2
(
n
k
)
λkcn−kQn−1(c)B2(c)
]
=
1
1− λn
·Qn−1(c) ·B2(c) ·
[
n−1∑
k=2
(
n
k
)
λkcn−k
]
=
1− λn − nλcn−1 − cn
1− λn
·Qn−1(c) ·B2(c) = Qn(c)B2(c)
which shows that Bn(c) ≥ Qn(c)B2(c). Now notice that Z(c) > 0. So, Q2(c) = 1 ≥ e
−Z(c),
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while for n ≥ 3
log(Qn(c)) =
n∑
k=3
(
log
(
1− λk − kλck−1 − ck
)
− log
(
1− λk
))
= −
n∑
k=3
(
log
(
1− λk
)
− log
(
1− λk − kλck−1 − ck
))
≥ −
n∑
k=3
kλck−1 + ck
1− λk − kλck−1 − ck
≥ −Z(c),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that log y− log x ≤ y−x
x
for y > x. Hence, since
B2(c) := P2(c), Bn(c) ≥ Qn(c) ·B2(c) ≥ e
−Z(c) · P2(c) for all n ≥ 2.
5.3 The generality of the approximate efficiency result
As said before, for any continuous probability distribution G on [α, β) from which valuations
are independently drawn and for any c ∈ (0, 1), we can construct a bisection auction for which
under the bluff equilibrium the probability of inefficient allocation is smaller than or equal to c.
A bisection auction that attains a level of inefficiency less than or equal to c can be constructed
as follows. For any decision node a with length (r− 1)n for some r ≥ 1, given the lower bound
of P (a) and the upper bound of H(a), choose the query price Q(a) in such a way that, given
that the valuation of a bidder is an element of [P (a),H(a)), the probability that his valuation
is in [P (a), Q(a)) is equal to (or less than) c. In other words, choose Q(a) in such a way that
G(Q(a))−G(P (a))
G(H(a))−G(P (a))
≤ c.
This auction will be regular as long as we choose Q(a) sufficiently far from P (a). This can be
done in many ways, but one of them is to choose Q(a) in such a way that
G(Q(a))−G(P (a))
G(H(a))−G(P (a))
= c.
Continuity of the probability distribution is merely required to guarantee that choices can be
made in this way. However, less demanding conditions would clearly suffice as well.
The bisection auction thus constructed is in general not a fixed fraction auction. It is clear
though that when G is the uniform distribution the fixed fraction auction with fraction c fits
the above description. Moreover, since the conditional probabilities generated by the fixed
fraction c are the only pieces of information that we use in the proofs in the above subsections,
it is clear that all the above results, and Theorem 5.2 in particular, extend immediately to the
general setting sketched in this subsection.
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6 Conclusions
We have shown that, in a setting where bidders have continuous valuations, ex post efficiency
–allocating the item to a bidder with the highest valuation– in a query auction can only be
obtained at the price of an infinite running time of the auction for almost all realizations of
valuations. We also showed that this negative result applies to a wide class of query auctions,
in particular bisection auctions.
Nevertheless, to alleviate this result, we also show that, for any continuous probability distri-
bution from which valuations are independently drawn, when we allow the allocation to be
inefficient with an arbitrarily small but strictly positive probability, there is a bisection auction
that attains this level of efficiency, independent of the number of bidders that participate in the
auction, and with a finite running time for all realizations of valuations.
7 Appendices
This section contains the proof of the Theorem of Green and Laffont, as well as proofs of
lemmata that are used in Section 4.
7.1 Appendix 1. Proof of the Theorem of Green and Laffont
Proof. Assume that (a), (b) and (c) hold. We will show that (w◦s, p◦s) is a Vickrey auction.
To this end, let v = (vi)i∈N be a profile of valuations in I
N . Since s is ex post efficient, we
know that
(w ◦ s)(v) = w(si(vi)i∈N ) ∈ arg max{vi | i ∈ N}.
So we only have to show that (p ◦ s)(v) = vsec, where
vsec := max{vi | i 6= (w ◦ s)(v)}.
Write i∗ := (w ◦ s)(v). Moreover, denote the profile of realizations of valuations ((vj)j 6=i∗ , r) by
(v | r), and the profile of actions (sj(vj)j 6=i∗ | si∗(r)) by s(v | r). The proof is in two steps.
I. First we will show that (p ◦ s)(v) ≤ vsec. To this end, take a valuation r ∈ I with r > vsec.
We show that (p ◦ s)(v) ≤ r.
Since the strategy profile s is an ex post equilibrium of (F,w, p) we know that s(v) is a Nash
equilibrium in the ex post game (F,w, p, v). Because i∗ = (w ◦ s)(v), we know that
ui∗(vi∗)(s(v | r)) ≤ ui∗(vi∗)(s(v)) = vi∗ − (p ◦ s)(v). (1)
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Now suppose bidder i∗ happens to have valuation r. Since r > vsec, ex post efficiency of the
strategy profile s in (F,w, p) implies that i∗ = (w◦s)(v | r). Moreover, since the strategy profile
s is an ex post equilibrium of (F,w, p) we know that s(v | r) is a Nash equilibrium in the ex
post game (F,w, p, (v | r)). Hence, by ex post individual rationality
ui∗(b)(s(v | r)) = b− p(s(v | r)) = b− (p ◦ s)(v | r) ≥ 0.
The last inequality implies that r ≥ (p ◦ s)(v | r).
Now, suppose that bidder i∗ chose action si∗(r) while having valuation vi∗ . Again, since r >
vsec, ex post efficiency of the strategy profile s in (F,w, p) implies that i
∗ = (w ◦ s)(v | r). So
ui∗(vi∗)(s(v | r)) = vi∗ − (p ◦ s)(v | r) ≥ vi∗ − r (2)
where the inequality follows from the result that r ≥ (p ◦ s)(v | r).
Combination of the inequalities (1) and (2) yields vi∗−(p◦s)(v) ≥ vi∗−r. Hence, (p◦s)(v) ≤ r.
II. Secondly we will show that (p ◦ s)(v) ≥ vsec. To this end, take an r ∈ I with r < vsec. We
show that (p ◦ s)(v) ≥ r.
Suppose bidder i∗ happens to have valuation r. Since the strategy profile s is ex post efficient
in (F,w, p) and r < vsec, we know that i
∗ 6= (w ◦ s)(v | r). Hence
ui∗(r)(s(v | r)) = 0. (3)
However, since s(v | r) is a Nash equilibrium in (F,w, p, (v | r)), we also know that
ui∗(r)(s(v | r)) ≥ ui∗(r)((s(v)) = r − (p ◦ s)(v). (4)
Combining equality (3) and inequality (4) yields that (p ◦ s)(v) ≥ r.
7.2 Appendix 2. Proofs for Section 4
We say that a node from D2j is in MD
2
j if none of the predecessors of this node is in D
2
j . We
analyze what happens in such a node when a player uses his bluff strategy.
Lemma 7.1 Suppose player j has valuation vj and follows the plan of action bj(vj). If a node
a is an element of MD2j and if player j is active in this node, then bj(vj)(a) = yes.
Proof. Let r be the round to which a belongs. If r = 1, then P (a) = α, thus vj ≥ P (a) and j
says yes. If r > 1, by definition of MD2j there was an active predecessor in the previous round
who said yes. Since j is still active, j also said yes. Hence vj ≥ Q(a(r − 1)) = P (a).
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As a consequence after round r player j either is the winner (in case no other player who
is active in round r and has ranking greater than j says yes) or he is active in round r + 1
(otherwise). In any case all players with ranking less than j are nonactive from then on.
Lemma 7.2 Suppose player j follows his bluff strategy, and a is a decision node of player j in
round r. Suppose that player j is active in a and says no for the first time. Then as long as
player j will stay active, his actions will be no.
Proof. If a ∈ D1j , then player j is not active in any future round. Suppose then a ∈ D
2
j , then
vj < P (a) < Q(a). This relation remains valid in any successor node of a.
The previous lemma states that, if player j follows his bluff strategy and says yes in node a
where he is active, then all previous actions of him were yes as well.
Given the realization of valuations (vi)i∈N suppose that player j follows his plan of action
bj(vj) while all other players follow s−j(v−j) –the profile of plans of action corresponding
to an arbitrary profile of strategies s−j . Let h be the realization of the game if the profile
(bj(vj), s−j(v−j)) is played.
Lemma 7.3 Suppose that in a regular bisection auction player j follows his bluff strategy and
j = W (h). Then T (h) < ∞.
Proof. Suppose that T (h) = ∞. It implies that |A(h)| > 1 and, by definition of W (h), for
all i ∈ A(h) it holds that i ≤ j. First we argue that no player in A(h) can say yes indefinitely.
If a player in A(h) would say yes indefinitely, then, because j = W (h), player j must do so as
well. However, since player j follows his bluff strategy, this implies that β = P ∗ ≤ vj by the
regularity of the auction. This contradicts the assumption that vj is drawn from [α, β).
Consider the round in history h where for the first time a player i from A(h) says no. Let a be
the decision node that player j reaches in this round. If any other player from Aj(a) says yes
in this round then i is not active in the next round, which contradicts the fact that i ∈ A(h).
If all players from Aj(a) say no in this round then, according to Lemma 7.1, player j says yes
and, again, i is not active anymore after this round. Since T (h) = ∞, this means that any
player from A(h) says yes indefinitely. Contradiction. Hence, we conclude that T (h) < ∞.
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